Documented Safety Analysis

FUNCTIONAL AREA GOAL: A document that provides an adequate description of the hazards of a facility during its design, construction, operation, and eventual cleanup and the basis to prescribe operating and engineering controls through Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) or Administrative Controls (AC).
 

REQUIREMENTS:

• 10 CFR 830.204, Nuclear Safety Rule
• DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization, 1992.
• DOE-STD-1104-96, Change Notice 1, Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis Documents (documented Safety Analyses and Technical Safety Requirements), dated May 2002.
• DOE-STD-3009-2002, Preparation Guide for U. S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, Change Notice No. 2, April 2002.
• DOE-STD-3011-2002, Guidance for Preparation of Basis for Interim Operation (BIO) Documents, dated December 2002.
• DOE-STD-1120-2005, Integration of Environment, Safety, and Health into Facility Disposition Activities, 2005 (two volumes)
• DOE HDBK-3010-94, Airborne Release Fractions/Rates and Respirable Fractions for Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, February 1996.
• DOE HDBK-1100-96, Chemical Process Hazard Analysis, 1996.
• DOE HDBK-1101-96, Process Safety Management for Highly Hazardous Chemicals, 1996
• DOE HDBK-1139/1-2000, Chemical Management, 2000

Performance Objective 1: Contractor Program Documentation

The documents should be clear, complete, consistent, and up-to-date.

Criteria

1. The DSA should accurately reflect current facility configurations, missions, hazards, scope of operations, and pertinent onsite and offsite conditions.
    
2. The DSA should be fully developed, approved, and implemented, and be consistent with the latest DOE requirements, unless the basis for deviating from these requirements can be fully justified.
    
3. The documents should be consistent, clearly presented, and reflected in facility directives and procedures.
    
4. The relationships between the DSA and other major safety management program documents (e.g., fire hazards analysis, criticality safety analysis, emergency response) should be defined and show consistencies.
    
5. The DSA should describe future facility life-cycle stages, missions, and operations, including deactivation and decommissioning, and explain the impact on the facility safety.
    
6. The hazards and controls documented in the facility DSA should be consistent with other environment, safety, and health documents for the overall protection of workers, public, and environment.

Suggested lines of inquiry and review approach for this performance objective

Performance Objective 2: Contractor Program Implementation

2.1 Hazards to receptors: The hazards and risks to workers, public, and environment should be fully defined.

Criteria

1. All hazards that can have potential harm to the workers, public, and environment should be identified and analyzed, including chemical, nuclear, industrial, fire, explosion, electrical, and seismic hazards.
    
2. The hazard analysis should specify bounding facility hazards in terms of type, quantity, and form, and include a facility hazard classification.
    
3. The hazard and accident analyses should cover all activities for which approval is given and be consistent in approach with established industrial methodologies, identify preventive and mitigative features for the spectrum of events examined, and identify dominant accident scenarios.

Suggested lines of inquiry and review approach for this performance objective

2.2 Controls: The controls to prevent or mitigate hazards should be clearly identified.

Safety Structures, Systems, and Components (Safety Class and Safety Significance)

1. The SSCs should be identified and described consistent with the logic presented in the hazard and accident analyses.
    
2. Safety functions and associated design criteria for safety SSCs should be clearly defined and be consistent with the bases derived in the hazard and accident analyses.
    
3. Functional requirements and system evaluations should be derived from the safety functions and provide evidence that the safety functions can be performed.
    
4. Control of safety SSCs relevant to TSR development should be clearly identified.

Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs)

1. The bases for deriving TSRs should be clearly identified in the SAR or equivalent safety documents and is consistent with the logic and assumptions presented in the hazard and safety analyses.
    
2. The bases for deriving safety limits, limiting control settings, limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, and administrative controls should be provided.
    
3. Operating procedures and training should be based on the TSRs.

Suggested lines of inquiry and review approach for this performance objective

Performance Objective 3: DOE Line Management Oversight

Line management should be committed to manage and maintain authorization basis per DOE directives.

Criteria

1. Line management should have appropriate plans and resources for developing, updating, reviewing, approving, and implementing facility authorization bases, including SER, USQ review, Operational Readiness Review, readiness review, and self-assessments.
    
2. DOE line management should follow responsibilities as set by DOE Order 411.1, "Safety Management Functions, Responsibilities and Authorities."
    
3.  Line management should update DSA per DOE requirements.
    
4. Line management should have and maintain an authorization agreement that contains key terms and conditions under which the contractor is authorized to perform the work.

Suggested lines of inquiry and review approach for this performance objective
 

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